Covid-19 vaccines and international politics
Recently, a strange “prisoner exchange” incident took place between Israel and Syria, in which an Israeli civilian who crossed the border into Syrian territory was returned to Israel in exchange for Syrian citizens held by Israel in similar circumstances. Apparently, this is an event that would probably have “passed under the radar” had it not been for various leaks to the media, regarding an alleged secret clause in the agreement mentioning active Russian involvement that deviated from “standard” mediation efforts, with Israel allegedly agreeing to millions “Sputnik” vaccines against Corona, to be handed over to the Assad regime. According to media reports, an Israeli source who revealed the details told that Israel had purchased several million vaccine doses from Russia to be handed to Syria.
This event, beyond being a precedent in the regional give-and-take relationship, a relationship that has hitherto been based mainly on the exchange of intelligence, security, financial assets, etc., and now added to them another health component, In this context, it is possible that in the near future we will see similar formulas in the context of Israel’s relations with the Palestinian Authority and the Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip, as a lever of pressure from Israel to achieve security and humanitarian goals (prisoner exchange).
In the international arena, a trend can be identified in recent months, in which players such as Russia and China are working to enter the existing vacuum when it comes to supplying vaccines to developing countries, especially in Asia, Africa and Latin America.
Leaving aside for a moment the issues (important in themselves) of the safety, reliability, and effectiveness of the Russian and Chinese vaccines, then in practice, Russia and China, which are clearly unable to break into the EU and North American markets (due to regulatory and political issues alike), turn to emerging markets, where not only the regulation is not restrictive, but in many cases, there is already an infrastructure of political and commercial cooperation.
If in the past the Russians and Chinese provided the developing markets mainly with weapons, infrastructure, and political support, in exchange for natural resources (oil, minerals, etc.) and increased political influence in those territories, now the health component also enters the equation. In today’s world, vaccines against Covid-19 have become an essential commodity — no less than energy and food. Many countries have realized that their way of returning to a normal life routine is through extensive vaccination of their population.
And since the US and the EU are failing to effectively promote the vaccination of the population in their territories, dealing with the Russians and Chinese in emerging markets in general does not seem to be on their agenda at this point of time.
In contrast, countries like Russia and China, in which there is no public monitoring or political transparency, can lead vaccine export policies, with no real restrictions, and by doing so they are increasing dependence and political grip on all those emerging markets.
When the pandemic will eventually end, those developing countries will remember who allegedly came to their aid (Russia and China) and who was busy with his own business (the West).
